

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 ISO-00 SAM-01 SAB-01 SAJ-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-10 AID-05 EB-07 TRSE-00

OES-03 FEAE-00 ACDA-05 EURE-00 OMB-01 CIEP-01 COME-00

CU-02 INT-05 STR-01 SCCT-01 SIL-01 LAB-04 /115 W

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P R 201230Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8803

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY SANAA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 04549

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, IS, XF

SUBJECT: FRG POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL AND

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THE MIDDLE EAST

REF: BONN 3679

SUMMARY: THE RECENT VISIT TO BONN OF FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON (REFTTEL), WHILE IT WAS CLEARLY CONSIDERED A SUCCESS BY BOTH SIDES, INEVITABLY SERVED TO RECALL THE UNUSUAL DIFFICULTIES BONN FACES IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER ONE REGARDS THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FRG AND ISRAEL--WHETHER AS A SIGNIFICANT DETERMINANT OF POLICY OR SIMPLY AS A SOMBER HISTORICAL BACKDROP TO A HAPPIER AND MORE NORMAL PRESENT--IT MEANS THAT THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN IMBROGLIO ARE PROBABLY MORE PAINFUL FOR THE FRG THAN FOR ANY OTHER EUROPEAN STATE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REITERATES FROM TIME TO TIME ITS DETERMINATION TO PURSUE A "BALANCED" POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE GERMANS ARE WELL AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR CONCEPT OF BALANCE IS A DELICATE ONE WHICH, IN THE EVENT OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES, COULD EASILY BE TORN ASUNDER BY THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. THEY SEE THEMSELVES CAUGHT IN A KIND OF FOUR-WAY CRUNCH BETWEEN THE RELATIONSHIP TO ISRAEL, THE COMPULSION TO SEEK COMMON POSITIONS ON IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES WITHIN THE EC-9, THE IMPERATIVES OF MATERIAL IL SUPPLY, AND THE NEED (AS THE MOST VULNERABLE OF NATO ALLIES) TO PROVIDE AS MUCH SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE FOR US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE FRG WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST WITHIN SECURE BORDERS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TRYING TO IMPRESS UPON ISRAELI OFFICIALS WITH INCREASING URGENCY THE NEED FOR "FLEXIBILITY" BASED ON THE THOUGHT THAT TIME IS NOT WORKING IN ISRAEL'S BEHALF. BUT THERE IS A QUESTION AS TO HOW MEANINGFUL THIS POLICY CAN BE IN A SITUATION OVER WHICH THE FRG HAS SO LITTLE CONTROL' END SUMMARY.

1. THE FRG'S SEARCH FOR "BALANCE" IN ITS POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST IS A PROCESS THAT DATES BACK AT LEAST TO THE PERIOD OF THE GRAND COALITION' IT WAS PROMPTED BY THE EXTREME IMBALANCE THAT RESULTED FROM THE DEBACLE OF 1965, WHEN THE DISCOVERY OF GERMAN WEAPONS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL CAUSED MOST ARAB STATES TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BONN. BY THE TIME OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR THE PROCESS HAD, FORMALLY SPEAKING, BEEN LARGELY COMPLETED, ALTHOUGH RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, IRAQ, AND THE PDRY WERE NOT REESTABLISHED UNTIL 1974. PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY WITH WHICH BONN PURSUED THIS POLICY WAS ITS RECOGNITION, LONG BEFORE THE FIRST USE OF THE "OIL WEAPON" IN CONNECTION WITH THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, OF EUROPE'S VITAL DEPENDENCY ON

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THE ARAB WORLD FOR ITS ENERGY SUPPLY.

2. A COMPLEMENTARY ASPECT OF BONN'S MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY HAS BEEN ITS ATTEMPT, WHILE NOT DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF A HISTORICALLY-CONDITIONED "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" TO ISRAEL, TO KEEP THAT RELATIONSHIP FIRMLY PLACED IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO BE A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF FRG POLICY IN THE PRESENT AND FUTURE. IN THE GERMAN VIEW, THE FRG, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT SUPPORTS ISRAELI POSITIONS, SHOULD DO SO IN ITS OWN INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF WHAT IT BELIEVES WOULD BE AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS--NOT, HOWEVER, AS A KIND OF PAYMENT ON A HISTORICAL AND MORAL DEBT.

3. PUTTING THIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE ISRAELIS WAS ONE

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P R 201230Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8804

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY SANAA  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 04549

OF FORMER CHANCELLOR BRANDT'S MAJOR OBJECTIVES WHEN HE VISITED ISRAEL IN JUNE 1973. HOW FAR HE SUCCEEDED IS A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION. THE GERMANS THOUGHT AFTER  
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THE VISIT THAT ISRAELI POLITICIANS AND OFFICIALS, AT LEAST, HAD UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED THE GERMAN POSITION; THEY WERE CONSIDERABLY LESS CONFIDENT OF HAVING MADE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN ISRAEL. THE ALLON VISIT, IN WHICH THE QUESTION OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS SKILLFULLY HANDLED BY THE ISRAELI SIDE, LEFT THE GERMANS WITH THE FEELING THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD NO LONGER BE AN IRRITANT IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS. ALLON DEFINED THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN TERMS OF WHAT FRG POLICY IN FACT IS--AN OBLIGATION TO STAND UP FOR ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. WHEN WAR BROKE OUT IN OCTOBER 1973, THE GERMANS WERE HARDLY PREPARED FOR THE STRAINS IT IMPOSED ON THEIR POLICY. THEIR REACTION, ESSENTIALLY, WAS TO STRESS THEIR OWN RELATIVE IMPOTENCE AND TO SEEK REFUGE IN THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A COMMON POSITION OF THE EC-9--A SURE GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VERY ACTIVE POLICY AND THAT SUCH POSITIONS AS WERE AGREED UPON WOULD BE REDUCED TO A RELATIVELY LOW COMMON DENOMINATOR. THE EUROPEAN POSITION TO WHICH THE FRG SUBSCRIBED WAS SUMMED UP IN THE EC DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 6, 1973--A DOCUMENT WHICH, WHILE IT UPHELD ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, WAS PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO APPEAL TO THE ARABS BY EMPHASIZING "THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE", THE "NEED FOR ISRAEL TO END THE TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION WHICH IT HAS MAINTAINED SINCE THE CONFLICT OF 1967", AND THE "RECOGNITION THAT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN OF THE

LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS." THE GERMANS HAVE TRIED, OVER THE YEARS, TO AVOID COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO A CLEAR OPINION ON THE EXTENT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES REQUIRED BY SC RESOLUTION 242.

5. IF THE FRG'S PARTICIPATION IN A SPECIFICALLY EUROPEAN MID-EAST POLICY IS TO SOME EXTENT A REFLECTION OF WEAKNESS (IT IS NOT THIS ENTIRELY SINCE THE GERMANS, AS ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION, ARE INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING COORDINATED EC POSITIONS WHEREVER POSSIBLE) ITS SUPPORT FOR US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
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IS NO LESS AMBIVALENT. IT STEMS FROM THE RECOGNITION THAT THE ONLY SERIOUS AND HOPEFUL EFFORTS TOWARD AN ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE ARE THOSE PRESENTLY BEING PURSUED BY THE US, AND FROM THE CONCOMITANT REALIZATION THAT A RENEWED OUTBREAK OF WAR WOULD ONCE AGAIN CONFRONT THE FRG AND ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS WITH ALL THE PAINFUL AND IRRECONCILABLE CONTRADICTIONS WHICH IN THE FALL OF 1973 LED TO SERIOUS TENSION BETWEEN THE US AND SEVERAL OF ITS NATO ALLIES. THE FRG'S UNCERTAIN REACTION TO THE USE OF US MATERIAL IN GERMANY FOR THE RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE BONN GOVERNMENT'S BEHAVIOR WHEN IT IS FORCED TO FACE UP TO MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES IN A CRUNCH. IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT ITS REACTION WOULD BE BASICALLY DIFFERENT SHOULD A SERIOUS CRISIS SITUATION ARISE AGAIN. BONN'S POLICY CAN ONLY HOPE TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE ABSENCE OF WAR. WITH A RENEWAL OF WAR ALL CHOICES WOULD BE MORE OR LESS BAD. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT WEST GERMAN LEADERS, WHEN THEY ARE ASKED TO COMMENT, ARE INCLINED TO STRESS THE HYPOTHETICAL CHARACTER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REIMPOSITION OF THE OIL EMBARGO, ARMED INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY WESTERN INDUSTRIAL POWERS, USE OF US MATERIAL IN THE FRG FOR THE RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL, AND OTHER ISSUES THAT A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES WOULD RAISE.

6. IN ADDITION TO SUBSCRIBING TO AN EC POSITION WHICH COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN UNWELCOME TO ISRAEL, THE FRG TOOK CERTAIN OTHER STEPS IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER WAR DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ITS STANDING WITH THE ARAB STATES. ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THESE WAS ITS AGREEMENT, ALONG WITH ITS EC PARTNERS, TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE AIMED AT INTENSIFIED ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EC AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THE GERMANS' APPROACH TO THIS DIALOGUE IS CHARACTERISTIC OF THEIR AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE

TOWARD MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES. THEY WERE INITIALLY  
RELUCTANT AND NERVOUS BECAUSE THEY FEARED THAT THE  
PROJECT WOULD UNAVOIDABLY GET MIXED UP IN MIDEAST  
POLITICS AND IN THE WORLD WIDE POLITICS OF OIL. THEY

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CU-02 INT-05 STR-01 SCCT-01 SIL-01 LAB-04 /115 W

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P R 201230Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8805

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY SANAA  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 04549

ENTERED INTO IT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE AREAS  
WOULD BE SCRUPULOUSLY SET ASIDE. THEY WERE NOT SURPRISED  
HOWEVER WHEN THE ARAB SIDE CONFIRMED THEIR INITIAL FEARS  
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BY INSISTING ON PLO PARTICIPATION, AND THEY HAVE BEEN  
PERHAPS THE FIRMEST VOICE WITHIN THE EC IN RESISTING  
THIS PROPOSAL. IN ADDITION, THE FRG TOOK THE POSITION  
FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE WOULD HAVE  
TO BE BALANCED BY CLOSER CONTACTS BETWEEN THE EC AND  
ISRAEL. RECOGNIZING THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN INCONGRUITIES  
IN THIS PROPOSAL--BECAUSE ISRAEL IS A SINGLE STATE, MORE  
HIGHLY DEVELOPED IN INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY THAN ANY OF  
ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, AND BECAUSE EC-ISRAELI ECONOMIC  
COOPERATION IS IN ANY CASE REGULATED BY THE JUST-  
INITIALED AGREEMENT OF ASSOCIATION--THE FRG HAS NEVERTHE-  
LESS INSISTED, IN THE FACE OF CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION  
FROM SOME OF ITS EC PARTNERS, NOTABLY FRANCE, THAT THERE  
IS A POLITICAL ISSUE TO BE FACED' FRG REPRESENTATIVES,  
WITH THE STRONG SUPPORT OF MINISTER GENSCHER, HAVE  
RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO THIS THEME, MOST RECENTLY AT THE  
MEETING OF EC POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN BRUSSELS ON MARCH 3-  
4, WHERE IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CONTACTS SHOULD BE  
MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE CURRENT EC PRESIDENT AND THE  
ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN THE APPROPRIATE CAPITAL.

7. THERE CONTINUES TO BE STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR  
ISRAEL IN THE FRG BASED LESS, WE WOULD IMAGINE, ON  
FEELINGS OF GUILT STEMMING FROM THE PAST THAN ON ADMIRA-  
TION FOR ISRAELI ACCOMPLISHMENTS, (PARTICULARLY IN THE  
MILITARY FIELD) AND, INDEED, ON A CERTAIN SENSE OF  
AFFINITY. SO FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE, THIS ATTITUDE HAS NOT  
BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED OR DISTURBED BY THE EVENTS OF  
THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF. TO THE EXTENT THAT WEST  
GERMANS HAVE BEEN INCLINED AT ALL TO REVISE THEIR THINK-  
ING ABOUT MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE  
YOM KIPPUR WAR, THEY HAVE BEEN FOR THE MOST PART POLITI-  
CIANS AND OFFICIALS CONCERNED OVER THE OIL SUPPLY AND  
OVER THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES THAT SEVERE ECONOMIC  
DISLOCATIONS WOULD HAVE IN EUROPE. STRONG SUPPORT FOR  
THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE IS FASHIONABLE AMONG SOME YOUNG

LEFT-WINGERS, AND IT IS INTENSIFIED BY THEIR DETERMINATION TO REGARD ISRAEL AS AN OUTPOST OF "US IMPERIALISM." THIS GROUP IS NOT NUMEROUS, HOWEVER, AND ITS INFLUENCE IS, IF ANYTHING, DECREASING AS A RESULT OF A DISCERNABLE CONSERVATIVE TREND, EVEN AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE. SIGNIFICANT  
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ELEMENTS OF THE GERMAN PRESS ARE VERY STRONGLY PRO-ISRAEL; THIS IS NOT LIMITED TO THE CONSERVATIVE SPRINGER PAPERS BUT INCLUDES OTHER RESPECTED JOURNALS SUCH AS THE SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG. FRG OFFICIALS ARE OF COURSE AWARE OF THIS BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC SYMPATHY AND IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT THEY WOULD NOT LIGHTLY INTRODUCE SHIFTS OF POLICY THAT WOULD OBVIOUSLY REPRESENT A DANGER TO ISRAEL.

8. IT SEEMS FAIRLY CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE EXISTING SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL COULD NOT SURVIVE ALL CONTINGENCIES WITHOUT DAMAGE; NOR DOES IT NECESSARILY EXTEND TO ALL ASPECTS OF ISRAELI POLICY. IF GERMAN ATTITUDES HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE THIS IS DUE NOT LEAST TO THE FACT THAT THE OVERALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE FRG HAS STAYED ON A REMARKABLY EVEN KEEL, DESPITE WIDESPREAD CONCERN OVER UNEMPLOYMENT. IF THERE WERE A DRASTIC DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION, HOWEVER, AND IF THIS DETERIORATION WERE TO BECOME ASSOCIATED IN THE PUBLIC MIND IN ANY WAY WITH "ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE",

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P R 201230Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8806

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 04549

THEN THERE COULD BE A CHANGE. SOMETHING LIKE THIS MAY  
HAVE BEEN WHAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAD IN MIND  
WHEN HE ARGUED WITH ALLON FOR GREATER ISRAELI "FLEXI-  
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BILITY", MAINTAINING THAT TIME WAS NOT WORKING IN  
ISRAEL'S FAVOR AND WARNING ALLON TO BEWARE OF "OIL  
OPPORTUNISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. GENSCHER IS OBVIOUSLY  
A FRIEND OF ISRAEL. DURING RECENT MONTHS HE HAS PUBLICLY  
STRESSED FRG SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WITHIN  
SECURE BORDERS MORE FIRMLY AND FREQUENTLY THAN ANY OTHER  
GOVERNMENT LEADER. HE IS A REALIST TOO, HOWEVER, AND ONE  
HAS TO ASSUME THAT WHEN HE TALKS ABOUT "OIL OPPORTUNISM"  
HE DOES NOT MEAN TO (AND COULD NOT) EXCLUDE HIS OWN  
COUNTRY AS A POSSIBLE VICTIM OF THAT MALADY.

9. A FEELING OF DEEP RESPONSIBILITY, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH  
A SENSE OF IMPOTENCE, ARE NOT EMOTIONS CALCULATED TO  
LIGHTEN THE HEARTS OF POLICY-MAKERS BUT THEY FORM THE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF FRG ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL AND  
THE MIDDLE EAST. THE FRG CANNOT AND WILL NOT DEPART

FROM A POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE WITHIN  
SECURE BORDERS. BUT THERE IS A SERIOUS QUESTION AS TO  
HOW MEANINGFUL THIS POLICY CAN BE IN A SITUATION WHERE  
MOST OF THE DECISIVE FACTORS LIE BEYOND BONN'S CONTROL  
AND WHERE THOSE OVER WHICH IT DOES HAVE SOME INFLUENCE  
(E.G. THE ATTITUDES OF ITS EC PARTNERS) ARE, TO SAY THE  
LEAST, VERY DIFFICULT TO MANAGE. IN THE END, GERMAN  
POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST WILL REMAIN ONE OF  
DESPERATE HOPE THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND COUPLED WITH  
THE CONVICTION THAT ITS OWN CONTRIBUTION CAN ONLY BE A  
SMALL ONE.

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## Message Attributes

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